Conflict of Laws by Stern, David S.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation





The field of law now under survey has often been said to be one
of utter mystery and terrifying uncertainty to judge and legal practitioner
alike, ' cutting across jurisdictional, procedural and substantive fields
of law with frank abandon. To make things worse it is a field strewn
with semantic quicksands and bordered by many misty, grey forests
inhabited by federal-state dichotomies and ruled over by forbidding
constitutional rules, hi the very center of this fabled land is the tree
of territorial sovereignty which houses the central philosophical difficulty,
exclusiveness. This charming paradox has enchanted the theorists who
would solve the problem. If each sovereign power is total and exclusive
within his territory then bow do laws and rules and judgments and
decrees from other places come to operate within his realm? They cannot
do so directly for that would rob him of his omnipotence and yet they
do. There are other lesser problems which we will study but before going
to that task let us state a fundamental bias. I take as the main purpose
of the conflict of laws not uniformity as such but rather the maximum
satisfaction of the sound expectations of the parties consistent with the
genuine public policy of the forum.
The conflict of laws establishes the limits of power-assertion of a
given state, and states general rules for the finding of the appropriate
law and the application of the right amount of that law in situations
where a tribunal is faced with a case involving elements, the legal effect
of which should not be governed by the local law.
Our system of administration of justice is sufficiently complex to
have brought within what is generally considered the conflict of laws
a large number of non-traditional subjects. The most important of these
stem from the federal nature of our government and deal with the
*Te Survey is designed to cover the cases of the Florida courts contained in
Volumes 49 So.2d i (1950) through 68 So.2d 927 (1954) and I Fla. Supp. 1 (1950)
tIhrough 3 Fla. Supp. 210 (1952). It considers the changes made in the Florida Statutes
by the General Laws of 1951 and 1953. Since it is the first timne, certain earlier cases
are discussed fur rcasons of background and continuity. The atthor regrets that more
of this could not have been done. '1'he views and biases where they appear are his
and do not reflect in any fashion either those of the University of Miami or the Miami
Law Quarterly, '1he same must be said of the errors or omissions.
**Associate Professor and Director, Inter-American Court Program, University of
Miami School of Law. Member of the New York and Florida Bars.
1. 'The same might be said of the professors, but among this group are some
who purport to have found the magic wand with which to pierce the veil of mystery.
Thev stand ready at all thes to lead their followers into the promised land. The
trouble in the past has been that not all roads lead to the same haven.
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control of the field by federal constitutional standards and the difficulties
of a dual system of courts.
Jurisdiction, in the sense of power-assertion, must be considered in two
general areas: the legislative and the judicial. Each in turn may affect
-persons, natural and juridical; things, real, personal, tangible and
intangible; and all kinds of rights. Overall is the control by the federal
and state constitutions of the exercise of power in any particular category.
This exercise of power may be absolutely denied. It may be present
but withheld voluntarily as in the forum non conveniens area. It may
exist but be used concurrently as with the enforcement of foreign judgments
within the comity area. Finally, when it is asserted, the foreign law
may be voluntarily used or compulsively used as in the federal diversity
jurisdiction.
This survey must be taken to be more a raw material gathering
expedition than anything else. Little attempt has been made to subject
the authorities found, whether judicial or legislative, to a searching academic
type analysis. In this field it is well enough that one be informed; that
alone is often better than that one be learned too. In this connection
comment must be made on the quality of the court and the bar in this
field. The former inevitably reflects the labor and diligence of the latter.
If the court is burdened, perhaps senselessly as it is in Florida, the bar
which practices before it must work harder.
Tim ExERCISE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS JURISDICTION
In general.-The purpose of this section will be to bring together
certain general observations and particular new rules having to do with
the administration in Florida of this field of law. Jurisdiction over
persons based on presence and domicile is asserted2 subject to the normal
limitations of fraud" and immunity.4 Jurisdiction over commercial activities
has been expanded to the constitutional limits by recent statutesa which
2. Thus, for example, Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (lla. 1952), which
held that a regular army officer could not establish domicile for purposes of divorce.
But cf. Gipson v. Cipson, 10 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1942) in which a soldier ordered to
Florida who registered to vote was found domiciled. For the normal rule see Mclntyre
v. Mcintyre, 53 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1951), one of the recent cases in a long line, where
NV's removal to another stale without more was held not to rebut a presumption that
her domicile remains that of II. And see the curious case of Harmon v. IHarmon,
40 So.2d 209 (Ia. 1949) commented on in another aspect in 4 MlAmi L.Q. 59,
69 (1950). In this case a "check pilot" transferred to Atlanta stated he had no
intent to return. I leld, this referred to his wife and not Niami.
3. See the authorities cited in the leading case of Wyman v. Newhouse, 93
F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937). See also the note in 115 A.L.R. 460 which reviews the
validity of service fraudulently procured in Florida.
4. The most recent case is State ex rel. Ivey v. Circuit Court in and for the Ith
Judicial Circuit, 51 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1951) reaffirming the right as extended to witnesses.
This broad rule has been in existence since Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla. 442, 178
So lz (1937).
5. Such as the foreign insurers act, now FI7 A. STAT. § 625.28 et seq. (1953),
and the foreign businessman act, now FLA, S'rAr. § 47.16 (1953).
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will be discussed in detail below. Florida has always had great concern
with the field of domestic relations. This concern has involved the
court in more than the normal number of cases dealing with full faith
and credit, comity and other devices" designed to regulate the effect of
judgments obtained in other jurisdictions.
The 1949 legislature changed the rule in the state with regard to
the effect given foreign law by enacting the Uniform Judicial Notice Act.7
Changes were also made in the two legislative sessions under review with
regard to adoption, support of illegitimate children and support of
dependents.8
No startling developments occurred in the area of jurisdiction over
things and relationships in the period under consideration. The legislature
modified the procedure for title registration in the automobile field 9 and
the court presaged interesting innovations in the administration of
estates' field.10
Limitations on legisldtive iurisdiction.-Two recent federal decisions"1
had occasion to consider the validity of a Florida statute,1 2 commonly
known as the Florida Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act. These cases
involve the construction of a statutory extension of an earlier doctrine
6. These devices are collateral estoppel and res judicata, discussed below at p. 226
with regard to the Gordon and Rieh cases.
7. FLA. SrAT. § 92.031 (1953). Of special interest in view of the progressive
construction given to a new act see Peterson v. Paoli, 44 So.2d 639 (1950) where notice
w;is taken of New York law and construction of same even in advance of action by
the courts of that state. On this case, see Comment, 4 M'1AMR L.Q. 497, 499 (1950),
16 A.L.R.2d 1094 and 23 A.L.R.2d 1441, 1447. See also Comment, 3 FLA. L. REv.
94 (1950).
8. Vka. Laws 1953, c. 28223, amendatory of FL.. STAT. 731.30 (1951). In
determining the validity of an adoption the Act obligates the court to look to the
laws of any state or country where the act took place. This new right is cumulative
of the already existing rights to inherit from, but not through, both adopting and
natural parents, FLA. SrrAT. § 72.22 (1953), and see the interesting Adoption of an
Adult Act. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.31-29 (1953). On support of illegitimate children sec
The New Bastardy Act, FLA. STAT. § 742.01, et seq. (1953). The Uniform Support
of Dependents Act is contained in Fla. Laws 1953, e. 27996. For a general observation
see Comment, 6 FLA. L. REV. 244 (1953). Several difficult constructional questions
are presented by this law and the scope it will be given will depend in large measure
on the attitude of the court. Its first construction came, merely in an allusion, in
Waterhouse v. Pringle, 68 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1953). Further comment is withheld
pending more significant action by the court.
9. See discussion of Fla. l.aws 1953, c. 28184 which substantially amended
FLA. STAT. c. 319 (1951), infra p. 241 et seq.
10. In its novel holding in Beverly Beach Properties v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604
(Fla. 1953) which is the latest in a series of cases discussing full faith and credit
in the probate field. For earlier stages in this legal battle see Miller v. Nelson, 160
Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948) and Nelson v. Beverly Beach Properties, 47 So.2d 310
(Fla. 1951). That the review is being sought in the United States Supreme Court,
see 'he Miami llerald, Jan. 17, 1954 at p. 22a.
Ii. Parnale v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n, 206 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.
1953), and Parnialee v. Iowa State [raveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
hereinafter referred to as the Parmalee cases.
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.28-665.33 (1951). The constitutionality of statutes in
this general field was upheld in Travelers' Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950); Note, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 149 (1951).
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which recognized that the insurance industry has always been peculiarly
sensitive to state regulation. This is particularly true after the passage
of the McCarran Act,' as the court points out in its majority opinion
in the first case.
. ..by the passage of the McCarran Act . . Congress has given
support to state systems for regulating the business of insurance.
It can not be disputed that Florida has the power, within
constitutional bounds, to prescribe the terms upon which insurance
may be placed and kept in force upon its residents. We are
without the benefit of any decision of the Florida courts
construing and applying the terms of the Florida statute here
involved. We attempt no construction of the statute further
than is necessary for the present decision. It seems clear,
however, that as to policies held by residents of the state which
are issued and delivered to them in the state by insurers not
authorized to do business there, the Legislature in the exercise
of its power to protect such residents, established and defined,
for the purpose of the statute, what constitutes doing business
in the state. We construe the legislation to apply only to
policies of insurance delivered in Florida to Florida residents."
This was specifically underlined in the second Parnalee case in
which the court refused to permit jurisdiction over the defendant insurer
based on issuance of a policy in Kentucky and before the effective
date of the enactment. Much support has been given to the point of
view taken in these present cases. Many years earlier the Supreme Court,
in American Fire Insurance Company v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co.,'
found that the Florida legislature could constitutionally enact the same
type provision" where an insurance company had an agent within the
state. In answer to the argument that the section as construed would
violate -the full faith and credit clause of the constitution in that it
would. deny such faith and credit to the laws of the state of Pennsylvania
and that: it would violate the privilege and immunities' clause, the due
process clause and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment,
the Court found there was nothing unreasonable about the Florida statute,
since it did not attempt to invade Pennsylvania and exercise control
there. It stayed strictly at home, only attempting to regulate the insurance
company when it comes to the state to do business with the citizens
of the state and their property.
Frequently, the legislature seeks to bring a transaction within the
orbit of regulation by giving a special definition to a conflict of laws
term such as "place of making" or an internal law term as "agent." 7
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 el seq (1946).
14. 206 F.2d 518, 521-22 (1953).
15. 250 US. 2 (1919), affirming 74 Fli. 130, 77 So. 168 (1918).
16. Now Fi.L. STATr. §§ 626.02, 626.03 (1951). Then FLA. GEN. STAT. §§
2765, 2777 (1917). Subsequently G.C.L. § 6222 (1929).
17. See comment to principal case in Cn118rHAI, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD AND
REESE, CAS s AND MArETALS ON CONFLICT oF LAWS, 521-22 (3d ed. 1951).
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Attempts on the part of legislatures to extend control by these
means have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States as
in the instant case, but where they appear to be unreasonable have been
overthrown.18 The doctrine originally laid down by Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick"' was that the nornal rule, that to protect its interests a state
may not be required to enforce in its own courts terms of an insurance
policy subject to the laws of another state where such enforcement will
conflict with the public policy of the state of the forum, does not operate
when the contract was made elsewhere and neither the original insured
nor the company are residents of the state where the property insured
was located. Where all of the elements are absent, the state can be
subjected to constitutional control over both characterization and choice
of law. In Griffin v. McCoach20 some of the elements were present and
the court was permitted to regulate on the basis of its local policy.2'
This localizing technique, used by the legislatures, is also frequently
utilized by the courts. In a case22 involving the construction of the
Homestead Tax Exemption, 2' the court defined the phrase "citizen of
and resides in the State of Florida" as excluding aliens under the United
States Constitutional terminology stating, "The court is of the opinion
that the phrase [in question] was iutended to comprehend only such
persons as under Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution would be entitled to clain citizenship in the state of
Florida in addition to residing in the state." 24 (Brackets supplied).
Ellis, P. J., dissented in an opinion which stated, among other things,
that he felt that the construction adopted by the majority of the court
ignored the rights of the state in virtue of its sovereignty to confer citizenship
Within its own limits where the rights incident to such a status are not
those of the citizenship mentioned in the Federal Constitution. He
stated that the term "citizen" as used in the 1934 Amendment has no
reference to allegiance. It is, as used in the amendment, almost convertible
with "inhabitant." The term cerlainly has no implication of a political or
civil right; it merely means permanent resident and inhabitant of the state.
XVhilc the term 'citizenship' is not synonyinous with 'residence,'
the two words 'citizen' and 'resides,' wheu combined in the phrase
'citizen of and resides in the State of Florida,' convey the idea of
permanent residence ii Florida-an inhabitant of the state residing
in it.25
18. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934),
19. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
20. 313 U.S. 498 (19411.
21. Cf. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916) where the state was- entitled
to regulate it in a fashion which it otherwise might not have done on the basis of
the fact that the property was present within the boundaries of the state.
22. Steuart v. State ex rel. Doleimascolo, 119 Fla. 117, 161 So. 378 (1935).
23. FA. CONST. Art. 10, § 7 as amended in 1934.
24. 161 So. 378, 37') (1935).
25. Id. at 380.
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He then went on to point out that this view would preserve the
anendment in question from attack, for all those who felt that it was
unwise to abandon completely the separate grounds of state citizenship
and federal citizenship. 0
In addition to the Parnalee cases another recent Florida decision
has appeared construing the extent of legislative jurisdiction.2 7 The Weber
case was an original petition in prohibition alleging that the Circuit
Court of Polk County lacked jurisdiction over the person and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the cause pending therein. It involved
the non-resident businessman statute, 28 and turns upon the construction
of the words "business or business venture." The petitioners here had
been non-resident operators of an orange grove for quite some time. They
entered into a contract with the relator, Weber, for the sale of the
grove subject to the usual commission. The statute, as applied to them,
was attacked as being unconstitutional in that it violated both the due
process and the equal protection of the laws' sections of the Federal
Constitution.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions discuss the leading
cases20 and authorities, but it is submitted that the handling of these
authorities by the dissent is much more persuasive,
The majorityo of the court held that the parties in question were
26. As a matter of historical interest, the section was again amended at the
1938 general election to read: "Every person who has the legal title or beneficial
title in equity to real property in the state and who resides thereon and in good
faith makes the same his or her permanent home shall be entitled, etc." In Smith
v, Voight, 158 Fla. 366, 28 So.2d 426 (1946), the court held that the purpose of
the change in language was obviously to reinstate the rule of the dissenting judge
IEllis) in the Steuart case and perhaps the original intent of the 1934 amendment.
They said: "Steuart v. State . . . was decided under the superseded section and is
of no help here other than to obvionsly signify a purpose in the change noted in
the later (1938) amiendlent."
27. State ex rel. Veber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953). In another
case the same statute was applied with greater soundness, see Chippy Furnitue v.
Boroehoff, 2 Fla. Snpp. 165, aff'd, id. at 166, cert. denied, 64 So.2d 794 (1952).
28. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26657, now FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1953).
Omitting the formal parts not pertinent to the case the statute reads:
'[he acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together
as a copartnership or any other form or typ) of association . . . of the privilege
extended by law to nonresidents and others to operate, conduct, engage in,
or carry on a business or business venture in the State of Florida . . . shall
be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such persons and foreign
corporations of the secretary of state of the State of Florida as the agent
of such persons or foreign corporations upon whom may be served all lawful
process in an action, suit or proceeding against them, or either of them,
arising out o any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to
such business venture ....
29. Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352(1927); Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Sugg v. Hlendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944).
30. The majority opinion was written by lobson, J., with Roberts, C.J., Terrell
and Mathews, .J., concurring and Thomas, J., agreed to discharge the writ of
prohibition. Justice Sebring joined Drew, J., in the dissent.
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not conducting a business but that the offer to sell the property was a
"business venture" within the meaning of the statute. They said:
One may engage in a 'business venture' without operatiig,
conducting, engaging in or carrying on 'a business.' . . . the
act of listing the property for sale amounted to a transaction
'connected with or incidental to' the 'business venture' which
the Webers initiated when they acquired the grove.3'
In applying these standards the majority makes the error of equating
one single, isolated transaction with that consistent course of conduct
which has always been required in order to give in personam jurisdiction
based on substituted service on a defendant. The relator took the position
that to be valid this statute must embody one of those extraordinary subject
matters falling within the police power of the state. The majority of
the court destroys this idea completely and states that it is perfectly
permissible to have such service because, in effect, the statute guarantees
due process by providing for notice, a reasonable opportunity to defend,
etc. Mere recitation of such provisions does not bring the subject-matter
within state power, if it bears no relation to state-interest. One can
doubt if, even in Florida, the protection of the real-estate vending industry
is such a matter. They make the further error that actual notice, because
it existed in this case, is sufficient constitutionally to satisfy procedural
due process.
Justice Drew, in his dissenting opinion, after making a careful
scmantical analysis of the statute and concluding that the statute was
directed to a more or less continued activity, makes several very cogent
observations. He first points out that in Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft.
Myers, Inc.,32 the court held that a single or isolated transaction did not
constitute "doing business" within the meaning of a statute3 very similar
in meaning to the statute here in question. He also emphasizes, and I
think in this he is probably far closer to the modern trend than the
majority, the language from International Shoe Company v. Washington4
that:
the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic
and continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted
in a larger volmc of intcrstate business, in the course of which
appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the
state, .. . It is enough that appellant has established such contacts
with the state that the Particular form of substituted service
adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be
31, 67 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1953).
32. 137 Fla. 853, 188 So. 853 (1939).
33. FLA. SZAT. § 613.01 (1951).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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actual * * * Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of
suit to appellant by regiStered mail at its home office was niot
reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit. '
What is important about this distinction is that the powerasscrtion
principle demands something either affecting the police powers, if it is a
single transaction, or a continuous series of transactions if it is without
the police power so that the state has a vested interest in the conduct
of the particular party. To lose sight of these controls creates a very
dangerous 0 situation as Justice Drew pointed out:
It is my view tl:at to extend the terms of the act to the point
that is done in the majority opinion, subjects substantially every
non-resident of Florida to the jurisdiction of the Florida Courts
in any action which might arise against them in this State. If
that is the effect, I feel the act offends Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that
citizens-of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States. It is my view, as
stated by the late Judge Curtis Waller in Sugg v. Hendrix .... 37
in speaking of a similar Mississippi act, 'If the regulation be one
for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of those
within its borders, rather than a mere attempt to extend the
jurisdiction of its courts over citizens beyond its borders, the stateis not without power to legislate to that end.' [142 F.2d 7431
(Italics supplied), 8
Lack of jurisdiction of person or subject nutter,-Another recent case
raises interesting questions in the already troubled area of res judicata in
Florida. This case, Kessler v. McGlone, 9° began with three attempted
actions for divorce, brought by V against 1-I in Virginia, each of which
was discontinued. She thereupon moved to Florida and established a
domicile. The bona fides of this action were not attacked. Her decree
of divorce was granted in 1946, and she died shortly thereafter. H thereupon
sued the executor of V's estate in Virginia for his statutory portion as
the surviving spouse. The executor defended on the ground that the
Florida divorce which W had secured was valid.
After a full litigation on the merits the court granted full faith
and credit to the Florida decree, holding H not entitled to take.'0
35. State ex rel. Weher v. Register, 67 So.2d 619, 624-625 (Fla. 1953). (Emphasis
and asterisked omissions supplied by the court).
36. The extent of the danger may be seen in Mc~riff v. Antell, 256 P.2d 703
(Utah 1953) by the contention, albeit rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, that
television advertising without more was "doing business" so as to subject the advertiser
to the type of control approved in the principal case.
37. See Conniet, 3 Ntl' L.Q. 623, 625 (1949).
38. 67 So.2d 619, 626 (Via. 1953).
39. 55 So,2d 791 (Fla. 1951), which affirms Judge Nlilledge's opinion in I
Fla. Supp. 118 (1950). ,
40. On appeal, affirmed by both the intermediate appellate and the irginia
Supreme Court, 187 Vt. lxii, 46 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 860, rehearing denied, id.
at 894 (1948).
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1-1 then journeyed to Florida and brought a bill in the nature of a
bill of review in the original court alleging that the decree had been
secured by fraud. Again the executor defended, this time on the grounds
of full faith and credit, res judicata and estoppel. Without deciding
the question of the personal incompetence of the plaintiff to raise the
particular objection, the circuit court set aside and vacated the decree
granting the divorce. The reason given by the court was that the wife,
while she may have been a perfectly valid and bona fide domiciliary of
Florida, had fraudulently given an incorrect address for H. H had therefore
not had that notice 41 which is required by the due process clause and
the divorce was for that reason void ab initio.
The per curiam affirmance stated merely, "affirmed under the
authority of Mabson v. Mabson.""'
The Mabson case was decided at a time when the courts still talked in
such archaic terms as matrimonial domicile.4 3 H was domiciled in Florida,
W was in New York and was served by publication.44 In due time H
secured his final decree. W also instituted suit in New York for separate
maintenance and support. H was served personally in the New York
litigation and subsequently W's bill was dismissed by the New York court
oi the ground that ". . . the matrimonial domicile of the parties was
in Florida . . . , that the Florida court had so held by granting to the
husband a final decree of divorce, by reason of which the New York
suit between the same parties would not lic."'45
Thercafter W brought her bill in the nature of a bill of review to
attack the divorce decree which had been rendered in favor of 1- against
V. She predicated her attack upon the authority of Shrader v. Shrader.4"
41. Both the domicile and notice requirements of FLS. STA-. § 48.01 (1953) have
been held to be jurisdictional on numerous occasions. See cases F.S.A. § 48.01
et seq. (1953).
42. 104 Fla. 162. 140 So. 801 (1932). The court might have given some
serious consideration to scvcral vexatious questions. What is the limit of the equity
power to set aside decrees? That such a limit exists has been reaffirmed by the court
in Edwards v. Edwards. 67 So2d 661 (Fla. 1953), a case very similar to the one
under discussion. What effect does such a denial of the faith and credit given in
another state to a Florida decree have on future Florida decrees? The publicity
attendant on the recent "expos6" of the divorce practice can have an even more
serious national impact if the two phenomena be taken together.
Is there any situation in which the court cannot exercise these extraordinary
powers? As by reliance, estoppell It would be extremely interesting to follow this
case through to its logical conclusion. Suppose that 14 returned to Virginia. Will
lie be met there with a plea of res judicata? And would that, of course, bar him from
asserting that the decree which Virginia fornerly gave full faith and credit to had now
been set aside as null and void? Is Virginia required to adopt the Florida interpretation
of its own law? See Johnson v. Mulehurger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). Perhaps if
Virginia refuses II, the Supreme Court will grant certiorari the next time.
43. On the demise of this concept see WVilliams v. North Carolina (I & I1),
317 U.S. 287 (1942) and 325 US. 226 (1945).
44. Under C.01, § 4895. now FLA. STAT. § 48.01 (1953).
45. Aff'd, 251 N.Y. 584, 168 N.E. 436, affirming 225 App. Div. 744, 232 N.Y.
Supp. 802 (1st Dep't 1929).
46. 36 Fla. 502, 18 So. 672 (1895).
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In that case, however, there had been a total failure of jurisdiction by not
fulfilling the essential requirements of the constructive service statute. The
court properly held that where a party had not had an opportunity to
appear or plead, lie might bring a bill to set aside the void decree.
In the Mabson case the husband filed a plea setting up the defense,
in effect, of rcs judicata.4 7  The court stated the essential point and a
most vital one:
We are not favorably impressed with the contention that the
plea was properly held good as a plea of res judicata. Many cases
have been cited to support it on that basis, but in our opinion
these cases are inapplicable to a situation such as we have here . . .4
In all of the cases cited, the proposition iivolved was whether or
not a jiudgment of the court of one state which had been rendered
to enforce a judgment of the court of another state could, when
sued upon in the courts of a third state, bc attacked for grounds
which would have rendered the judgment uneiforceal)le in the
second state. No such situation is involved here. Tbis is a suit
filed in a Florida court setting up the contention that the very
court in which it was filed had previously rendered a void degree
against the complainant . . . . Such a proceeding is not a collateral
attack but is a direct attack upon the decree . . . . The fact that
an attempt has bcce made to collaterally attack the [Florida]
decree . . . in a proceeding between thc same parties in the
state of New York in which proceeding the courts of the state
of New York had adjudgcd that the Florida decree was not
subject to such collateral attack cannot be said to be res judicata
of a controversy in the Florida courts between the same parties
respecting the Florida court's jurisdiction in the prcvious suit.
This Court is committed to the doctrine that the courts of
this state have a right to determine whether judgments or decrees
which have been entered by them on constructive service were
validly entered ..
The right of a Florida court to determine whether or not its own
jurisdiction has been properly invoked and exercised cannot be
barred by what has been determined by the courts of any other
state. The courts of this state retain at all times jurisdiction to
entertain a bill or other proceeding making a direct attack upon
the validity of decrees eutercd here, so whatever may have been
decided in some other state in a collateral proceeding, whether
between the same parties or not, would constitute no bar to a
procccding in the courts of this state inl which the courts of
this state are called upon to determine for themselves their ownjiurisdictioni and the regularity of their owi1 judgments.)"
47. The court's precise language is "here deiiminated as a plea of res judicata,"
104 Fla. 162, 140 So. 801, 803 (1932). The lower court had stistaiucd the plea on two
grounds, that of res iudiclta and as a bar to (ie suit itself on equitable grounds.
I8. The court cited, among other imporlant cases, Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S.
449 (1928); Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); and Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y.
156 (1854). All of these cases involved a judgment reviving a judgment.
49. 40 So. 801, 803-4 (Miss. 1906). (Italics supplied). The court then proceeded
to decide the case on the ground that even if this is not res judicata still the wife
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The holding in the Mabson case and the dicta quoted are sound
but the two cases are not in pari materia.0  In Mabson both parties
were still alive and able to testify as to their conduct. In Kessler there
was reliance of the most definitive type, the wife had died.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction. - Another extremely interesting case,
McCord v. Smith,"1 raised questions concerning full faith and credit as
well as the construction of Florida probate law. Appellants brought
actions for injuries caused to them by appellee's decedent, one Oscar
Smith, in Iowa. On petition of the executor, appellee herein, the two
cases were consolidated and removed to the federal district court, where
they were litigated to judgment for plaintiffs, appellants here.
Proof of claim was then filed in probate and, after various mesue
proceedings, 52 this appeal resulted. The court below was of the opinion
that the language of the statute in question 3 meant any Florida court
of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court felt that "any court"
should not be territorially limited5 4 since the cardinal purpose of the
statute was to facilitate an orderly and expeditious settlement of estates.
The intent of the legislature was to require that the claim be filed either
in the office of the county judge or presented by service of process in
an action against the personal representative. The purpose for this is to
make certain that notice to the creditors and the personal representative
would be given. If the second method is followed, as in the present
case," ' the law requires the administrator or executor to file a suggestion
of the pendency of the suit in the office of the county judge.
Should the personal representative be derelict in his duties it is
no concern of the creditor. '1'hc object to be accomplished is
fulfilled as completely in the instance of a claim determined in
had so estopped herself as not to be able to attack the decree. It seems to me that
this alternative ground destroys a great deal of the force of the reasoning of tile
court as to its basic point.
50. Nor does tile court, in its per curiam, tell us on which it relies, holding or
dicta and if the latter on which of the many.
51. 43 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1949).
52. Proceeding below in the County Judge's Court, Orange County. The
Execttr filed objections and demurred. The court sustained his demurrer to
claimant's pleas.
53. L'tA. STAT. § 733.16 (1951), after making general provisions for an eight
month non-claim period, sets forth in (I)b the following:
Any suit heretofore commenced and in which service of process was had
upon the personal representative within the period hereinabove specified,
(eight-months from first publication) and which may. now be pending
in any court against the personal representative . . . . (Italics supplied).
54. In this they followed Brooks v. Federal Land Bank, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So.
749 (1932) where they had held another statute valid insofar as it had extra-territorial
effects reasoning that, since there was no discrimination between residents and
non-residents, that statute ought to be interpreted in such a way as to give it the
most equitable effect possible. But they said it should be limited to "every court
ill a jurisdiction wherein a statute similar to our statute §§ 47.29 and 47.30 . . . and
which does not violate organic law, exists." For similar construction of "any court"
in the support field see Lopez v. Avery, 66 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1953), infra nota 72.
55. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1)(a) (1951).
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another state as in one wherein the claim was adjudicated in this
jurisdiction.
We do not believe it necessary to cite authority for the wel
established general rule recognized in this State that acceptance
of service is as effective as service of process upon the defendant
in personam.
Ow Statute does not require personal service of process upon
the executor. Consequeutly, we believe it was the legislative
intent to encompass each and every type of service which does
not offend the constitutional requirement of 'due process,' and is
legally sufficient as a basis for a judgment or decree in personamin.
The court then made this important statement concerning the scope
of full faith and credit.
If our conclusion be construed as giving extraterritorial application
to [the] chapter . . . to the extent indicated, we hold that it
should and does have extra territorial application .... The Statute
does not attempt to make a claim which arose in a sister state
or the claim of a non-resident-per se-invalid and we see no
reason why any prejudice should exist (with reference to the
presentation of a claim) against a non-resident creditor whose
claim was adjudicated in a court of another state. Indeed, under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution we
are required to recognize such judgments. It seems clear, therefore,
that we should not give to the Statute a restricted interpretation
which would result in a failure to treat all creditors alike. Such
is not the policy of the law. 8
Extraterritorialit.-The Conflict of Laws, particularly in its
choice-of-law area, is one of the more important control mechanisms in
our federal-state system. Lawyers are always well-advised to have the
entire field in mind when litigating problems, but the importance of a
careful study of the extraterritorial effects of proceedings had in Florida
can never be underestimated 9  Even in the field of ordinary interstate
litigation,60 it is obvious that lawyers practicing before the Supreme Court
of Florida (and sometimcs 'the court itself) are unmindful of these
consequences.
56. 43 So.2d 704, 708 (Fla. 1949). A fortiori where not only has there been
service but participation. Some limitations are placed on the doctrine. Thus the
court expressed no opinion "as to what our conclusion might be in a case wherein
attempted service of process was not recognized, accepted and treated by the executor
as valid and binding."
57. Fla. Laws 1917, c. 23970.
58. 43 So.2d 704, 708 (Fla. 1951). (italics supplied).
59. It is trite that this same caution must be exercised in the" legislative field
and for the same reasons. Florida is a jurisdiction which must preoccupy itself more
with the problems inherent in the migratory character of mid-twentieth century life
than perhaps any other state. For one attempt to resolve such problems see Stern
& TIroetschel, The Role of Modem Arbitration in the Progressive Development of
Florida Law, 7 IANHI L.Q. 205 (1953).
60. The abnormal situations created by large numbers of non-national transients
must also be remembered, but planning in this area is even more difficult. Cf.
I'awley v. Pawley, 16 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
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Johnson v. Johnson is an excellent example. 1 W secured a divorce
a mensa et thoro in Maryland and was awarded alimony and support
for an infant child. Two years later H obtained a decree of divorce in
Dade County. No petition for alimony was made at the time of
granting the original decree but in a supplemental decree the court
stated:62
.nothing in this decree shall be held or construed to relieve
the plaintiff in any manner from complying with the support and
maintenance provisions of that certain decree rendered by the
Circuit Court . . . of Baltimore City, State of Maryland ....
11 then petitioned the Maryland court to amend its decree eliminating
the alimony award in view of the Florida divorce decree.68
In the previous opinion 64 the court had pointed out that the husband's
domicile in Florida was not questioned, and that the wife had appeared
generally, so that a question of "the divisible-divorce doctrine"6 5 was not
presented here. Insofar as the technical choice of law question was
concerned, the Maryland court appeared disposed to follow the results
reached in the Lynn case."6
Having thus made its choice of law, the court makes it abundantly
clear that the alimony provision could not, under Maryland law, survive
the dissolution of the marriage by the Florida court.6 7 The point which
must be stressed is this:
'That [Florida] decree was obviously based on the erroneous
assumption that the obligation to pay alimony in Maryland would
61. 92 A.2d 330 (Md. 1953). It must be made clear that no individual
criticism of the attorneys involved in this case is intended. The ease is one of many
and as the Florida record is bare, extenuating circumstances may have existed. For
a case illustrating dual litigation see Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt, 66 So.2d 815 (Fla.
1953) and the same case 343 Ill. App. 539. 99 N.E.2d 623 (1953).
62. 97 A.2d 330, 331 (Md. 1953).
63. NV meanwhile appealed the original Florida decree which was affirmed,
without opinion, 49 So.2d 340 (la. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 941 (1952).
64. 86 A.2d 520 (Md. 1951), in which the same court had reversed an increase
in maintenance award entered by the lower court.
65. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). In the same earlier opinion the
court also cited Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951), wherein the
New York Court of Appeals had held that a general appearance Nevada decree in
which the wife had failed to ask for alimony and the court had failed to grant it
superseded the alimony provisions of a prior separation decree obtained by W in
New York.
66. See note 65 vupra; the New York court felt that the effect of the Nevada
decree as such should be governed by Nevada law, but that its consqtences with
regard to the New York separate maintenance award should be governed by a New
York law.
67. See the various Maryland authorities, 97 A.2d 330, 332 (Md. 1953). On
prior appeal, 86 A.Zd 520, 523 (Md. 1952) the court had stated:
If the Maryland court actually possesses any of the jurisdiction which seems
to be reserved to it in the Florida decree, obviously neither the Florida decree
nor the full faith and credit clause prevents the Maryland Court from exercising
such jurisdiction. If, however, under Maryland law the Maryland Court has no
authority to act as permitted under the Florida decree, then obviously the
Florida Court has no power to confer jurisdiction upon the Maryland Court,
and the Maryland Court has no right or duty, under the full faith and credit
clause or otherwise, to exercise such jurisdiction.
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survive a dissolution of the marriage in Florida. Under the laws
of sonic states the obligation would survive, but we have held
otherwise .... On that question the Maryland law must control,
despite the declaration of the Florida Court disavowing any
intentions to relieve the plaintiff from his obligations under the
Maryland decree. It may be noted that the supplemental
decree did not purport to impose an obligation to pay alimony in
Florida where it was not asked for. It may well be that the
Florida Court had, and may still have, authority to award alimony
ill its own right.,,,
The misconstruction of Maryland law was most unfortunate in
this case. While there may be a possibility of the continuing right in
Florida, still the most efficacious fashion in which this particular wife
could have been protected has undoubtedly been lost.
In the field of family law, it is often very difficult to determine
exactly which proceedings are subject to constitutional control and where
the lines will be drawn within those proceedings which are partially
subject to that control.," For this reason the opposite result to that in
Johnson v. Johnson was reached in Lopez v. Avery,70 where the court
exercised its admitted power to vary a support decree made in another
jurisdiction.
H brought suit for divorce in Missouri. W, who was then, and still
is, a domiciliary of Florida, personally defended the suit. During the
litigation an agreement between 1I and W was reached which provided
for a property settlement and $100 monthly support for the child. The
agreement was approved and incorporated in the final decree of the
Missouri court.
Several years later plaintiff (wife) filed a complaint in Florida
alleging inadequacy of the amount provided for in the agreement. At
the time 1-I was in Florida on vacation and was served personally. The
Circuit Court for Duval County granted H's second motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the cause of action. On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed:
Broadly stated, the rule in respect to foreign judgments and
decrees is that one state may not modify or alter the judgment
or decree of a sister state, because . . , fill faith and credit must
be given to it as it stands. lowevCr, . . . it will be see that
upon one theory or another the courts of many of the states have
permitted suits to readjudicatc the extent of parental liability for
68. Cf. Roseman v. Roseman, 155 Fla. 750, 21 So.2d 215 (1945) in a note
by the court. 'he difficult question of the effect of the award in Florida of alimony,
had it been made, was left open. Its enforceability is an open question in many
jurisdictions.
69. There is a total absence of full faith and credit control in the field of
adoption, filiation and custody. The 14th Amendment controls are relaxed, but not
totally absent. The same used to be true in the administration of estates area, but
quacre now in Florida with the recent decision in Beverly Beach Properties v. Nelson,
68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
70. 66 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1953).
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support of minor children domiciled within the state, even when
a provision for child support has been incorporated in a prior
sister state's decree. While recognizing the general rule that
foreign decrees as a class are res judicata of the matters involved
for all time in the future, the courts make a distinction in respect
to orders or decrees for child support when by the laws of the
state of rendition such orders subject to change. Decrees for
child support and custody are usually regarded, in fact, as being
impermanent in character, and hence, by their very nature, are
res judicata of the issues only so long as the facts and circumstances
of the parties remain the same as when the decree was rendered.7'
The appellee (1-1) maintained that to extend tne provisions of the
statute72 to foreign decrees would be contrary to the provisions of the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and would make
the statute unconstitutional to that extent. "We cannot agree with this
contention," said the court. "The law of Missouri is that the terms and
conditions of a decree for child support rendered in that state is (sic)
subject to revision in that jurisdiction upon proof of a change in
circumstances of the parties ... Hence, the full faith and credit clause
does not stand as a constitutional bar to this suit. What Missouri could
do by way of making new provisions for support payments, Florida may
also do; for the decree has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive
or final effect in the state of the forum than it has in the jurisdiction where
rendered."73
The court then goes on to make the distinction that it is powerless
to vary the terms of the Missouri decree directly but that upon a proper
showing of a change of circumstances it may achieve the same result "...
by way of supersession of the terms and conditions thereof ... .74
It should be pointed out that the principal case leaves open the question
of whose law and whose standards are going to be used to determine
whether the amount of support is adequate; the standard of living of
the particular parties may be entirely different in Florida than in
Missouri.
71. ld. at 691-692. (Italics supplied); cf. Minick v. Minick, Ill Fla. 469, 149
So. 483 (1933).
72. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1953) insofar as here material, states, "whenever any
husband and wife ... shall have entered into any agreement . . . or whenever any
husband has pursuant to the decree of any court of competent jurisdiction been
required to make . . . any such payments . . . " then, on change of circumstances,
either of the parties may apply for an order and judgment of a changed amount.
This is another instance, see note 54 sutra, for the construction of same language in
the estate situation, where the court must construe the meaning of "any court."
As to the effect of the modification, the statute contains this interesting language:
such agreement, or such decree, for the purpose of all actions or proceedings
of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within or without this state, shall
be deemed . . . modified accordingly." Does not the principal case, by its own
result, allow this to be "superseded"? Certainly Florida cannot go this far, or can it?
73. 66 So.2d 689, 693 (Fla. 1953). The court cites as authority for this
proposition New York ex tel. Halvey v. -lalvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
74. 66 So.2d 689, 694 (Fla. 1953), enxhasis supplied by the court. It is
interesting to note that Fla. Laws 1953, c. 2799 , the Uniform Support of Dependents
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Effect of prior proceedings: Herein of full faith and credit and comnity.-
Many foreign created rights and judgments do not fall within the strict
scope of full faith and credit. When a tribunal is faced with the problem
of deciding on the efficacy of a prior proceeding not within the constitutional
area, it will normally give effect through the doctrine of comity." This
does not mean that it must abandon any of the policy grounds which
would be effective to deny full faith and credit were it dealing with the
type judgment entitled to such respect, Neither should it free the court
to strike down apparently valid international judgments capriciously. The
general compromise has been to adopt the doctrine of reciprocity."
Several Florida cases have dealt with this question. In Ogden v.
Ogden,77 H and W were married in 1930, and established a domicile in
England. H moved to Florida, established a domicile and requested that
his wife and child join him. NV refused and brought an action in the
High Court of Justice to restore her conjugal rights. The court awarded
her £2,000 "alinony."78  H then brought an action for divorce in Florida
on the grounds of desertion which W moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the English proceeding was res judicata. The court below refused
to give it this effect as to the matter of desertion and granted the divorce.
The Supreme Court affirmed, saying in effect that since an English
court in the suit to restore conjugal rights would deny effect to a similar
decree issued in a foreign country on the grounds of lack of finality, Florida
was entitled to give the English decree the same respect.
In addition the court stated that if W's interpretation of the English
Act, provides very serious civil responsibility for non-support. The constitutionality
of the act has not yet been established in Florida. On the subject, in general, see
Brockelbenk, Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional?,
17 Miss. L. Rav. 1 (1952). There is little difference between lack of proper support
and total lack of support. Perhaps the ultimate on the support problem is the recent
decision, State v. James, 100 A.2d 12 (Md. 1953), wherein Maryland joined Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts in applying criminal penalties, in addition to civil remedies under
the Uniform Act, to enforce support of dependents not within the jurisdiction. See
RESTATEMFNT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 457 (1934) and Comment, 22 U.S.L.Week
2221 (Nov. 24, 1953). It seems obvious that this line of cases, as well as the
rationale of the Uniform Act, would wipe out the implicit basis for the holding in
the principal case that there is an obligation to prevent persons from becoming
public charges.
75. On the doctrine of comity the landmark case is Herron v. Passailaigne,
92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926). The court laid down this proposition: "The
rules of comity may not be departed from, unless in certain cases for the purpose of
necessary protection of our own citizens, or of enforcing some paramount rule of
public policy." Id. at 542. But cf. the remarks of Terrell, 1., in City of Thomasville
v. Turner, 100 Fla. 748, 130 So. 7 (1930).
76. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the leading authority, calls for
strict reciprocity. The Supreme Court has not made it a rule of decision for the
lower federal courts, so that apparently a court sitting in the 2nd Circuit could follow
the more liberal rule of Johnston v. Compagnie Ceneral Transactlantique, 242 N.Y.
381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926). A narrow policy in the field could lead to its occupancy
by the federal government: cf. the tragic consequences of United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942). For a very interesting commentary on the importance of liberality
see Nadlemann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 l-ARV. L. Rav. 1184 (1952j.
77. 33 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1948).
78. This would be the equivalent, in our terms, of separate maintenance.
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procedure be correct then it so fell below the American standards of due
process that it "would lift it out of the class rightly entitled to international
reciprocity." 79
Further consideration was given the same difficult question in Pawley
v. Pawley. 0 Here W refused to remain with H in China where he felt
compelled, for business reasons, to establish the matrimonial home. He
subsequently returned to Cuba and became domiciled there. In Cuba
he instituted a -suit for divorce on the ground of desertion. W brought
this action for alimony 1 and the Chancellor dismissed it. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the Cuban divorce was entitled to the same
effect as a divisible divorce within the scope of the full faith and credit
clause. It had terminated the marital status but did not end W's right
to alimony, which could only be effected by an in personam proceeding.8t
In Sackler v. Sackler83 we have an example of comity being extended
to the point of greater full faith and credit than the Constitution would
require. W had obtained a divorce with support provisions in New York.
She sues for arrearages in Florida and invokes the general equity powers
of the court. Below she was granted only a judgment for those amounts
past due but on appeal the Supreme Court extended this to include the
full amount and added that this decree should be enforced as if it were
a domestic decree.
We hold, therefore, that under the rule of comity, as well as
the principles of public policy involved in the obligation of a
husband to support his wife and children, the New York decree,
as to future installments, may be established as a local decree and
enforced by those equitable remedies customary in the enforcement
79. 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1948). The court seems to have
confused, perhaps unintentionally, the public policy exception as applied to judgments
from common-law countries which are given a wide enforceability with the narrower
scope normally given to non common-law type judgments. Also it seems somewhat
surprising that the Florida court should consider an English ex-parte adjudication
of desertion to be a violation of due process. Cf. note I of the court in Pawley
v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464, 471 (Ma. 1950).
80. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950), cert denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950). It should
be noted that Mr. Justice Terrell, who wrote the opinion for the court in Ogden
v. Ogden, dissented here. Perhaps he felt that his own dictum, "jurisdiction' of the
parties is the first prerequisite to a valid judgment . .. and it makes no difference
whether the parties are lounge lizards or the highest ranking citizens" was not being
paid proper heed. See 33 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 1948).
81. Unconnected with a cause for divorce under FLA. STAT. § 65.10 (1953).
82. The court intimated that had not the grounds for divorce in Florida
been complied with in fact the result might have been different. It should be
pointed out that the court when it said that insofar as Ogden spoke of citizenship
as a jurisdictional prerequisite it was incorrect that it should have said residence
is really not being semantically exact. What it really meant to say was domicile.
That it may become constitutionally possible to substitute mere residence for domicile
in divorce jurisdiction will depend on the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. granted and
assigned docket No. 531, 22 U.S.L. Week 3206 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1954), Note, 67
HRv. L. REV. 516 (1954).
83. 47 So.2d 292 (Eta. 1950); see Note, 5 MIAMt L.Q. 105 (1950) and 4
U. of F.A. L. Rrv. 243 (1951).
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of our local decrees for alimony and support money. If it were
otherwise, a husband, determined to defeat a decree for alimony,
could cross the border lines of our 48 states to avoid enforcement
by contempt, and by resort to fraudulent practices endeavor to
put his property or income beyond the reach of an execution ....
We have no desire to make this state a haven for fugitive husbands.,'
Res judicata and estoppel by judgment.-In the preceding part of
this section the distinction between the almost automatic enforceability
under full faith and credit and the rather tenuous effect under comity was
adverted to. The courts have recognized the need for some middle
ground that will give flexibility and liberality at the same time. In an
effort to create such a middle ground, the Supreme Court of Florida has
become involved85 with a rather sinister and unmanageable dichotomy-
that of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. While hints of the
doctrine have appeared in numerous earlier cases, it received its first full
blown exhibition in Gordon v. Gordon."' Some of the difficulties became
apparent almost immediately as may be seen from another case that
followed on the heels of the Gordon litigation, Riehl v. Riehl.81
The problem in the Gordon matter was subjected to a most protracted
litigation. In its first appearance before the Supreme Court,8 that
eminent tribunal found that the chancellor below had failed to give full
faith and credit to the Pennsylvania proceeding between the same parties,
which had resulted in a decree adverse to W. The first action in Florida
was on the basis of "extreme cruelty" and the court held that a bar should
operate since the foreign divorce action on the basis of "indignities to
the person" involved the same testimony and general grounds. Upon
remand, W amended her bill to include a charge of desertion, the decree
was entered and H appealed. Once again the court considered the problem
of whether full faith and credit to the Pennsylvania decree required that this
new action be barred.
Apparently some lawyers and text book authors believe there
is confusion in the law of this jurisdiction upon the question,
tinder what circumstances does the doctrine of res adjudicata or
the principle of estoppel by judgment become operative. In all
probability the confusion which apparently exists stems from a
failure clearly to comprehend the difference between the doctrine
of res adjudicata and estoppel by judgment and to understand the
84. 47 So.2d 292, (Fla. 1950). This expresses the same policy as was enacted
into statutory form in the Uniform Support of Dependents Act, note 74 supra. Cf.
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1950), another situation in which
full faith and credit was given.
85. That the need which gave rise to this problem is not confined to Florida,
see Dean, Conflict of Laws, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1366 (1953). For general background,
see, Millar, Res Judicata and Estoppel, 39 MiCn. L. REV. 1 (1940) and 35 ILL. L. REV.
41 (1940).
86. 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
87. 60 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1952); see Note, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 250 (1953).
88. 160 Fla. 838, 36 So.2d 774 (1948).
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test proper to be applied in determining which, or whether either,
may be appropriately invoked. Estoppel by judgment has its
counterparts, or at least its quasi-counterparts, in 'estoppel by
verdict' and 'conclusiveness of verdict.' Either res adjudicata or
estoppel by judgment furnishes the primary test in determining
the applicability of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution, Art. 4, § I.8 9
What is it that the court would have us understand? Does the
Constitutional mandate of faith and credit operate in the case of both
doctrines, with a difference in scope or is faith and credit given in one
instance and denied in another?
The court continues:
This Court has at least indicated that full faith and credit
need not be given to a final decree of a sister state when estoppel
by judgment is the appropriate test unless the 'precise facts' offered
by the plaintiff in the Florida action were heard and determined
in the former suit which was adjudicated in the foreign
jurisdiction. 0
This might be contrasted with the following language of the court:
We have held as a general proposition that when a final decree
or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction becomes absolute
it puts at rest and entombs in eternal quiescence every justiciable,
as well as every actually adjudicated, issue. This pronouncement
is considered by us as controlling only when res adjudicata is the
proper test. By this we mean it is not controlling except in an
instance wherein the second suit is between the same parties
and is predicated upon the same cause of action as the first.91
The court does not tell us, although it intimates that the decision
would be by the forum, whose law will be used to determine what
is a cause of action or when there is identity of causes. It would seem
that a narrow or restrictive holding on this question could destroy the
very purpose of the full faith and credit clause. But the court continues:
A great many courts and text book writers treat 'res judicata'
and 'estoppel by judgment' as synonymous. The most erudite
legal minds appear to have difficulty in stating the difference
which they consider exists between them ... Although dissertations
have come to our attention in which the doctrine of res judicata
is considered as a sub-division or branch of the law of estoppel,
strictly and technically speaking, such treatment is not proper ....
The difference which we consider exists between res judicata
and estoppel by judgment is that under res judicata a final decree
or judgment bars a subsequent suit between the same parties based
upon the same cause of action and is conclusive as to all matters
germane thereto that were or could have been raised, while the
89. 59 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1952).
90. Ibid. But see the reference which the court makes to Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153
Fla. 471, 14 So.2d 841 (1943).
91. Ibid.
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principle of estoppel by judgment is applicable where the two
cause of action are different, in which case the judgment in the
first suit only estops the parties from litigating in the second suit
issues-that is to say points and questions-common to both causes
of action and which were actually judicated in the prior
litigation. 2
Thus the court reached the conclusion that full faith and credit
need no longer be given the Pennsylvania decree since the amended bill
of complaint raised grounds not litigated and neither part of their dichotomy
would operate to protect the holder of the rights vested under the prior
decree.
Subsequently in the Reihl case93 the court referred to this clarification
process outlined above and found an identity of parties and cause of
action; hence res judicata; hence full faith and credit. This result should
not, however, be taken to be automatic in either of its stages, the
classification under res judicata or estoppel by judgment and the faith
and credit to be given if placed in res judicata. Certainly, the respect
paid under the latter is not what the constitutional norm envisaged.
LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION
Full faith and credit: Foreign custody decree.-in Lambertson v.
Wiliams,9 4 H and W, the parents of the child whose custody was in
litigation, were divorced in New Jersey, custody having been awarded
to W. W married H2 and came to Florida with one child, leaving the
other with her parents in New Jersey. The grandparents petitioned the
New Jersey court for a modification of the original decree granting them
the custody of the child in question; W appeared through counsel and
participated in the hearing on the petition -which was granted. On the
basis of the -decree awarding- them custody the grandparents brought
habeas corpus in Florida. The court below found the decree was not
binding in Florida-that Florida might act independently considering
solely the best interests of the' child." On appeal this decision was
reversed. W, the mother, had her choice of forums and having litigated
in New Jersey is not entitled to relitigate the same issue. A change in
conditions96 would have given the Florida courts authority to enter a new
92. Id. at 44.
93, See note 87 supra. The court states quite properly that BagivelU, note 90
supra, is not controlling since the test used there was that of estoppel by judgment,
whereas the instant case is one to which res judicata should be applied.
94. 61 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1952).
95. It acted on the authority of Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734
(194!). The more recent Florida cases rely on the "change of circumstances" rule of
N.Y. ex rel. 1lalvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 600 (1947). They are Littler v. Franklin,
40 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1949); Eddy v. Stauffer, 160 Fla. 944, 37 So.2d 417 (1948), 3
MIAMI L. Q. 279 (1949); Gilman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 606, 29 So.2d 372 (1947).
96. Cf. the rule on support laid down in Lopez v. Avery, 66 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1953).
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custody award without violation of constitutional precepts. Here, however,
the New Jersey decree was entitled to full faith and credit.
Determination of legitimacy.-One of the most interesting statutes
passed by the 1951 legislature was the new Bastardy Act.97  It provides
a somewhat more liberal procedure for the determination of paternity,
and raises the amount of support to bc provided the filiated children
by the parent or parents found to be responsible for the procreation of
such children.
The first case to litigate the scope of the Act was Rooney v. Teske s8
Action was brought charging defendant with being the father of the
plaintiff. -The immediate question before the court was whether the
Act could apply constitutionally to a child born before its effective date.
The chancellor granted defendant's motion to dismiss. He ruled that
the action would not lie because the child was born in Massachusetts in
1949 and the Act could not be made retroactive.
The court found the Act could constitutionally overcome both
objections of time and territory. Mr. Justice Terrell stated:
We think it makes no difference whether the accouchemrent
took place in Florida or in Massachusetts as the record discloses,
or that it took place two years before the effective date of:the
Act .. . [It] was designed to require the father of a bastard
child, when its paternity is established, to contribute to its support,
and whether born before or after the effective date of the act
(I. c. sic) is not material. As to paternity and support the act
(1. c. sic) shows on its face that it was intended to be retroactive
as well as prospective in effect.99
The opinion fails to consider, even for a minute, what law should
be selected to determine the question of paternity or legitimation which
97. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 at seq. (1951).
98. 61 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1952). See also Phillips v. McGriff, 61 So.2d 631
(Fla. 1952).
99. Ibid. The court points out that the State-Federal ex post facto prohibition
applies only to "criminal Acts." Surf Club v. Taten Surf Club, 151 Fla. 406, 10
So.2d 554 (1942); Ambrosia Brewing Co. v. Bowles, 147 F.2d 550 (Em. Ct. App. 1944).
That this Act contains no element of the "criminal" is taken for granted. Because
his (Mr. Justice Terrell's) language is always colorful , although sometimes over-
enthusiastic, some more is set forth here:
In addition to this, the act [again lower case] conforms with every impulse
of right, justice and decency. Even the birds, the dumb animals and the
savages are imbued with an instinctive sense of responsibility to provide for
their young while they are unable to provide for themselves. (It must be
assumed that "they" refers to the young, although in the context the phrase
is not entirely free from ambiguity. Author's note]. That is all the Act
in question does and the reason is that the ill-fated mother and the equally
ill-fated offspring may not become a charge on the public. There is no
better settled principle of public policy than that it is the duty of every man
to provide food and raiment for his own, and the purpose of- the Statute was
to spell out this principle and apply it to all of his own even though they
be bastards. It imposed no responsibility that was not already in good
conscience incumbent on the father of a bastard. 61 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 1952).
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is closely associated with it. Nor does it concern itself with the infinite
possibilities of blackmail which might flow from the broad interpretation
of the statute made in this case.
The question whether a filiation and support judgment, obtained before
the 1951 Act, was res judicata in a similar proceeding brought under the
new Act was decided in Wagner v. Baron.100 The lower court had so
held it. The Supreme Court, in reversing, stated:
The cases are legion which hold that res judicata is not a defense
in a subsequent action where the law under which the first
judgment was obtained is different than that applicable to the
second action, or there has been an intervening decision, or a
change in the law between the first and second judgment, creating
an altered situation. 101
The prior judgment can hardly be binding as to rights which were
not in existence and which could not have been litigated at that time.
The doctrine of res judicata "is not meant to create vested rights in
decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with time.' 0 2  "We
hold then, that, the former judgment is not res judicata of the matters
presented by the instant suit, including the question of paternity as
well as the question of the amount, if any, to be awarded as support for
the child."' 03
The reasoning of the majority of the court is quite interesting. They
felt that to apply the principle of res judicata would be "to penalize the
appellant for her diligence in prosecuting her action against the putative
father . . . and would reward the indolent mother who failed to so
proceed [under the old Act]."'1
Interesting is this reasoning may be, it failed to produce a unanimous
court:'0 5 There was also a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Terrell,
100. 64 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1953).
101. Ibid. Among the numerous cases cited to this rule, however, not a single
Florida case is to be found.
102. Imbrici v. Madison Ave. Realty Corp., 199 Misc. 244, 99 N.Y.S.2d 764
(Sup. Ct. 1950) quoted with approval in 64 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1953).
103. 64 So.2d 267. 268 (Fla. 1953).
104. It is rather hard to see how the court could allow relitigation of a
determination of the filiation question adverse to the interests of the unwed mother
on the basis of the language of the 1951 act. That the amount of support, previously
awarded, could be changed, even in the absence of specific statutory authority, on the
basis of the public policy argument of Terrell, J. in Rooney v. Teske, 61 So.2d 376
(Fla. 1952) is clear, and might have been adverted to here.
Of course herein nothing is said about the obligation of the state to see that
ill-fated mothers and bastards do not become public charges. With this control
removed, the act, as construed by the court, can become even more easily a convenient
way for some "unwed mothers" to better their positions in the world.
105. Mr. Justice Thomas dissented with whom Sebring and Matthews, Jl. concurred.
lie stressed this very point, (see note 104 supra) saying:
. . . instead of the strife having ended and certainty as to individual rights
having been produced by the adjudication, . . . there would be an invitation
to all similarly situated to come into Court and get a readjudication of the
same issue in the hope that the second award would be an enlargement of
the first. 64 So.2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1953).
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which deserves a nobler fate than an almost anonymous burial in the
Southern Reports.1°1
STATE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Erie Doctrine.-Two recent cases will give some indication of
the trend in the use of (and the limitations on that use) state law in
the federal courts sitting in diversity cases. The first is the typical case
in which the Federal Court gives the standard Erie v. Tompkins10 7 respect
to the state law. It comes out of the fifth circuit and construes a
matter of Florida law.108 Suit was brought by an insurer to rescind a
life policy because of alleged material misrepresentations knowingly made
in the application for the policy. After considering the various factual
matters involved in the case, the Court made the following statement:
106. The Old Act [of Jan. 5, 1828] was passed more than 100 years ago
and required the father of a bastard child to contribute not exceeding fifty
dollars annually for his support. That amount would not supply him with
candy and ice cream cones at the present prices ....
Since the Old Act was repealed, the New Act substituted in its place and
paternity adjudicated tinder the Old Act, I think all the mother was required
to do was to petition the Court to decree support as required by the New Act.
There was no reason for the New Act except to provide a reasonable living
scale for bastard children. It is not even suggested that it prescribed a basis
of support out of harmony with present day cost of food, raiment and schooling,
let alone nurture and baby sitting.
It seems to me that the only real point for determination is whether or not
gentlemen (?) who sneak around and propagate bastards may be required to
support them in keeping with their means and ability to meet present economic
standards.
I think this question impels an affirmative answer. The legislature certainly
had power to enlarge the pattern of support. (Author's note: Logically then
why could not the legislature have removed all stigma, penality, and disequality
by granting the courts acting in support of bastards the same type of jurisdiction,
the flexibility they have when decreeing that of legitimate children and leaving
the amount subject to modification for change of circumstances.] The
wonder is that they waited so long and in the face of rising prices to do so.
When the Old Act was passed a midwife's charge for officiating at the
accouchement was five dollars. You could buy a 300 pound steer for four
dollars, pork was two cents the pound, eggs were ten cents per dozen, corn
and potatoes were 25 cents per bushel and you could hire a room in the
best hotel in Jacksonville for fifty cents. It was the good old days when our
great, great grandfathers and mothers bought their snuff and tobacco in
bladders, cured their sausage in chitterlings, read their Bibles on their
bellies in front of the log fire and planted corn when the oak leaves got
as big as possum ears. Such were the criteria that determined the standard
for a bastard's support at that time . . . .I do not think the doctrine of
res judicata has any place whatever in this litigation. I think it is out of
all reason to hold that the legislature intended that the father of last year's
bastard might contribute support by a standard fixed more than 100 years
ago, while the father of this year's bastard must support at present commodity
prices. I cannot read any such logic in the New Act.
64 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1953). For other Terrellisms, see Morgan v. Morgan, 40 So.2d
778 (Fla. 1949) and particularly, 4 MIAMi L.Q. 59 n. 72 (1950); Cohen v. Schott,
48 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla. 1950) and Comment thereon in 5 MIAM L.Q. 286 n. 60
(1951). It is to be hoped that the time has come for some "aficionado" to collect the
judicial opinions of Justice Terrell. Such a volume would enrich the lives of all of us.
107. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
108. Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Everglades Discount Co., 204 F.2d 937 (5th
Cir. 1953).
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'he policy is a Florida contract to be interpreted according to
Florida law. Barnett v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
5 Cir., 123 F.2d 712. By its express terms, the statements made
in the application arc representations, not warranties. In
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Poole, 147 Fla. 686, 3 So.2d 386,
the Supreme Court of Florida held that false answers, made
by an insured in good faith in an application for a life insurance
policy, do not necessarily vitiate the policy. This decision followed
an earlier Florida decision, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kincaid,
122 Fla. 283, 165 So. 533 . . . The questions asked in the Kincaid
case are comparable to those here involved. In Madden v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 138 F.2d 708, 709, 151 A.L.R.
984, this court in interpreting the Poole case, said: 'In so ruling,
the Florida Supreme Court, expressly rejected the distinction made
in the Madden case (on a prior appeal), and accepted by most
of the courts in the country...lo0
and further stated:
Whether or not, in all the circumstances, the insured regarded
the tumor as inconsequential, and hence was in good faith in
failing to report it, was a question of fact for the jury under the
Florida decisions, and under our Madden case, 138 F.2d 708.10
The quoted language, particularly the first quotation, will show that
the federal court sitting in diversity cases is not only properly using the
Florida substantive law, but is also by implication using the Florida
choice of law, because we must assume that there will be situations in
which the facts tying a particular contract to a particular state law will
not be as clear as they were in the instant case. The assumption is that
even if the facts were not so clear, the federal court will look to the
local standards of characterization and choice of law to determine whether
under those local standards the particular contract in question would be
interpreted as a Florida contract.
In the other recent case, which is cited merely as an example,'
the following statements were made with regard to the Federal Tort
Claims Act." 2 This is the act which in its Section 1346 (b) contains
the interesting choice of law provision which gives jurisdiction to the
district courts over actions and injuries caused by an employee of the
United States "under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred."
Conceming this provision, the court stated:
On the other hand it is a settled law of that state (New York],
following the- common-law, that the release of one of several
109." Id. at 940.
110. Id. at 941.
111. Rushford v Unitcd States, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953), Per curiam, Learned
]land, Augustus N. Hand, and Frank, Cir. JI.
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. (1946).
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joint tort-feasors, without reserving any claim against the others,
releases all. [Citing authorities] The plaintiff's answer to this
is that, although the Act adopts the local law so far as concerns
those facts that are necessary to determine whether a claim arises
at all, it stops there. Transactions that may release the claim,
or, we assume, may affect its continued existence in any other
way, are not within the words: 'Under circumstances where . . .
a private person, would be liable.' We need not say whether
the effect of a release, executed in another state, is to be determined
by the law of that state, or by the law of the state where the
aim arises, for the release at bar was executed in New York; and
the plaintiff does not tell us to what law we are to look: whether
to some 'general' or 'federal' law under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865, or elsewhere. Nor need we seek
any such umbrageous refuge; for it is plain that Congress meant
to make the proper state law in all respects the model for the
liabilities it consented to accept; and that the 'circumstances'
included as much those facts that would release a liability once
arisen, as those on which its creation depended. 13
Several other attitudes are possible with regard to the applicable
state law when a federal court sits in diversity cases. One is the use of
the state law for constructional purposes where the court, in effect, chooses
that one of a variety of state laws which it finds appeals to its taste.
In Rosenblatt v. United States," 4 a case involving an action for wrongful
death under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the court stated the following:
The North Carolina law controls. It is true that North Carolina,
differing from sonic other jurisdictions, has adopted the rule that
a driver of an automobile who 'outruns his headlights' is guilty
of contributory negligence, and in several cases our Court has
found such guilt as a matter of law. For example, in the case
of Morgan v. Cook, 236 N.C., at page 477, 73 S.E.2d 296,
such was the holding.1 5
The court then goes on to state that there are other cases to like effect.
But there are North Carolina cases in which apparently a
contrary conclusion was reached. In Pawell v. Lloyd, 234 N.C.
481, 67 S.E.2d 664, in reversing a judgment of nonsuit, the
Court declared: 234 N.C. at page 486, 67 S.E.2d at page 667,
'The plaintiff cannot be charged with contributory negligence as
a matter of law merely because he did not stop when the high
shining lights of oncoming traffic partially blinded him . 10
The court then discusses several other possible variations, particularly
those stated in another federal opinion, and reaches this conclusion:
I do not find, either as a matter of law or fact, that lie failed
to exercise the care of a person of ordinary prudence . . . . It
follows from the above that the contention of the defendants
that the negligence of the driver of the automobile was the sole
113. 204 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1953).
114. 112 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. N.C. 1953).
115. Id. at 117.
116. Ibid.
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proximate cause of tie collision and resulting deaths and injuries
must be rejected. Respect is given to the North Carolina cases
cited by the defendant, but it is held that they do not require the
holding suggested in this case.' 17
This might very well be called "the construction of the state law"
method.
Then we have another brief example in the case of Beck v. F. W.
Woolworth 'Co.,"" which is an action- construing a lease. Here we have
one of the traditional reactions of a federal court sitting in diversity
cases where it encounters no state law. 19
The applicable law is that of the State of Iowa. There are no
Iowa cases directly in point. In the case of Oskaloosa Water
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 1892, 84 Iowa 407, 51 N.W. 18,
there was involved the right of the taxing authorities to assess
improvements of a permanent nature . . . to the lessee as
real estate ....
The case most strongly relied upon by the plaintiffs is the case
of Roach v. Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass'n, D.C.
Alaska 1949, 87 F. Supp. 641. That case was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1951,
188 F.2d 162, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court ....
The court stated the conclusion which it reached as follows:
In this case jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship.
There are no direct holdings of the Iowa Supreme Court on the
rules of law here involved. In such a situation federal courts have
to anticipate which rule, or rules, will be followed by the highest
court of the state when such court is presented with a similar
situation. . 120
Federal courts in the situation referred to are warranted in assuming
that the highest court of the state will follow the more generally recognized
rule, -or rules, of -law:. - They' are not justified in assuming that such
court will follow a single decision from another jurisdiction. Werthan
Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 6 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 119, 124, 125. While the
cases on the question involved in the present case are not numerous,
yet it seems to be the more generally stated or otherwise recognized
rule that where a lessee erects a structure of a permanent character on the
leased premises under a lease of moderate length without the right of
removal that, in the absence of over-riding considerations, the duty of
117. Id. at 118.
118. 111 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
119. The most classic case of this, of course, has been Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d
163 (7th Cir. 1952). There have been a large number of articles written on the
question of what is "state law" for purposes of Erie v. Tompkins. See Rosenfield,
Administrative Determination as State Law Under Erie v. Tompkins, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 319 (1950). In United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301
(1947) the general test was laid down that "state law" is that which is established
by any "state authority" acting as such.
120. 111 F. Supp 824, 831 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
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paying the taxes thereon rests upon the lessor. In the present case no
considerations are found which are generally recognized as being of an
over-riding character.
It is the view of the court that, until there is a specific holding by
the Iowa Supreme Court on the question here involved, it may properly
be assumed that the Iowa Supreme Court would follow what seems
to be the more generally recognized rule and would hold that in
situations such as the one presented in the instant case the duty of
paying the taxes involved rests upon the lessor. 1 '
Federal law in the state courts.-While the problem of federal law
in the state courts is not as troublesome as its converse, the existence
of certain difficulties must be mentioned. Federally created rights of the
non-constitutional class were properly handled in a recent case typical
of the area, Chambers v. Loftin.22  Here the sole question on appeal
was the propriety of the trial court's order taking the case from the jury
and directing a verdict for the defendants. In reversing, the court stated:
The rights which the Federal Employers' Liability Act creates
in favor of employees engaged in interstate commerce are federal
rights protected by federal rather than local rules of law .. .
Whether the trial court acted properly in taking the case from
the jury must therefore be determined in the light of applicable
federal decisions.
Under the federal decisions the rule obtains that courts must
submit the issues of negligence to a jury if the evidence might
justify a finding either way on those issues." 3
One of the difficulties referred to above occurs in that area midway
between a clear Erie situation in the' federal courts and the pure state
jurisdiction as above, even though federal law may be involved. This
grey area is presently composed of two main subdivisions. One is where
a federal court, sitting in federal-question jurisdiction, must choose law.
This is discussed in another section. The other is when the federal court
sits in diversity but finds no satisfactory state law. In this latter situation
the federal court may wait or it may lead. The possibility of such
influence from federal to state law is illustrated in Hay v. Wanner.12'
Suspecting a new trend in the Florida court, the federal court has
anticipated the possibility of a reversal of old doctrine.125
121. See note 118 supra.
122. 67 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1953).
123. Id. at 221.
124. 204 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1953).
125. Thus it distinguished the long line of cases stemming from Norton v. Baya,
88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924) as being based on a purely gratuitous attempt to
change homestead to an estate by the entireties. In finding a consideration for
the transaction in question it scented and followed the new trend of thought in
the state court as expressed by Terrell, J., dissenting in Florida National Bank of
Jacksonville v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947).
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Fu. FArm AND CRnnI
Lack of jurisdiction in granting court.-One of the limitations 26
on the enforceability of foreign judgments under the full faith and credit
clause, and one of the issues that may always be re-litigated in the state
where enforcement is sought is that of the jurisdiction of the court in
the granting state over parties and/or subject matter. Markham v.
Nisbet'2 raised the original lack of jurisdiction point.
Action was brought in Florida (F2) on a judgment obtained in
Ohio (FI). Tle judgment was based on a promissory note dated
April 18, 1928, payable one year from date and containing a warrant
of attorney authorizing confession of judgment. Suit had been filed
in F1 on April 15, 1949. Appellant raised the defenses that it affirmatively
appeared on the face of the judgment roll that the action in Ohio had
been barred by the 15-year statute of limitations of that state; that necessarily
any warrant of authority would expire by operation of law with the action;
and that there had been no personal service. Below, all these defenses
were overruled. The Supreme Court properly governed these questions
by Ohio law. 28 It found that appellee had not sustained the burden of
proving validity of the F1 judgment and reversed without prejudice to
such further action on the note as would be possible? 20
Penality, public policy and foreign statutes.-The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. I'etter"'10 has given impetus
to a changing attitude with regard to the enforceability of foreign created
rights. The change in the statute implementing full faith and credit
to include statutes passed almost unnoticed.' 3' Not so the decision which
126. Others are lack of finality, lack of a tribunal in which enforcement may
be had, penalty and violation of core public policy of F2. As to penalty see the
discussion of Burkman v. Taran, infra. As to core public policy, cf. the limitations
implicit in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
127. 60 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1952).
128. The Ohio law on these two points was admitted by appellee. As to the
rule that a judgment in personam without jurisdiction is a nullity see St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350 (1882). The Florida authorities on the right to raise this attack are
Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 10, 12 So. 526 (1893) and Herron v. Passailaigne,
92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926). The second of these cases, and the principal
case, involved defects apparent on the face of the judgment rendered in Fl. Thit
the problem may be much more difficult where such is not the case or even where
jurisdiction in Fl has been incorrectly determined, see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U.S. 66 (1939).
129. The real question was that of the Ohio law on the matter of the burden
of pleading absence of the obligor so that the Statute of Limitations would be tolled.
The Ohio law was that absence tolled even in a confess-judgment note situation. But
the Florida court adopting the rule in Horowitz v. Shafer, 94 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1950)
distinguished the Samrnmis case and Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932)
in that there the judgments were prima facie valid and the judgment debtor should
have the burden, whereas in the present case with the defect apparent, the judgment
creditor should have the burden.
130. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
131. By part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, conforming the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1946) to the Constitution for the first time in 150 years.
See comment on the clause in general in Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
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gave it real force. Now Florida has joined the progressive states in
striking down the exception to full faith and credit with regard to
actions on foreign tax statutes. The traditional view has been that
these statutes were penal in nature and that only after the cause of
action had been reduced to judgment could extraterritorial enforcement
be had. 32 This most important case was decided at circuit and it is
set forth below in extenso133 due to the fact that opinions of these
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COL. L. REv. 1 (1945) and on this parttciular aspect
see the excellent Article by Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutess: The Defense
of Public Policy, 19 U. of Cm. L. REv. 339, 343, (1952).
132. Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
133. Burkman v. Taran, decided by Giblin, J., at law. For those who might wish
more of the background of this case the docket number is 28594-H, l1th Judicial
Circuit, 1953:
The plaintiff sues, in behalf of the State of Minnesota, for the recovery of
an income tax in excess of $6,000 assessed against the defendant for the
calendar year 1944 (during which the defendant was a resident of Minnesota).
The validity of the assessment and the amount of the tax are not disputed.
Counsel for the defendant advances the contention that an action for the
collection of a tax due to another state is not maintainable in the courts
of this state. It must be conceded that the opinions and decisions of the
courts of other states, cited by counsel, support his contention. See cases
cited in 51 Am. Jur. 868-9 in footnotes to the text, and in 165 A.L.R. in
the annotation at pages 769.801. In some of the cases relied on by counsel
for the defendant the courts have reasoned that taxes are imposts collected
for the support of the government, and not debts in the ordinary sense
of the term, and that the principles which preclude a state from enforcing
the penal laws of another state should be applied to revenue laws so as to
preclude a state to which taxes are due from maintaining in the courts to
another state an action for the collection of the taxes, In other cases, the
courts, appreciative of the obvious dissimilarity between penal laws and revenue
laws, have boldly held, without any attempt to provide logical support for
their conclusions, that since the revenue laws of one state have no force
in another, no action can be maintained by one state in the courts of another
state for the recovery of taxes due in the former.
The precise question here presented has not been decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States or by the Supreme Court of Florida. Consequently,
I am not guided by any binding precedent.
Stripped of their sophistry, the opinions and decisions in the cases on which
the defendant's position is bottomed are that by crossing state lines one may
escape his obligation to pay an income tax to a state of which he has been
a resident and in which he has realized the taxed income. I am asked to
follow such precedents and to bold that Florida is a sanctuary for tax evaders.
I refuse to do so.
If the defendant owed a debt to a private citizen of Minnesota, there would
be no impediment to the institution and prosecution in Florida by the
creditor of an action for the recovery of the amount due. Why, then,
should a sovereign state, a member of a union of states, be denied a right
which we freely accord to one of its cititzens? There is no justification,
in my opinion, for not permitting an action in the courts of this state for
the collection of a debt due another state. The principles of comity, it seems
to me, demand that we grant to the sister state the right to sue. The
contrary doctrine has no place in a union of states such as ours.
My conclusion finds cogent support in the opinions and decision in State
ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers (Mo.), 193 S.W.2d 919, in
which the same question here raised was presented.
Unfortunately, however, while I hold that an action by the plaintiff, in
behalf of the State of Minnesota, against the defendant in this court for
the recovery of the tax in question may be brought, I am constrained to
deny relief to the plaintiff for the reason that our statute of limitations, to
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courts are only irregularly reported. 34
SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE
State law.-One of the most important regulatory devices in the
conflict of laws is that known generally under the label of characterization.
We deal in this section with that part of the characterization process
which attempts to distinguish between procedure and substance in the
conflict of laws. This topic today has two entirely different meanings:
(1) state "procedure-substance" and (2) federal diversity "procedure-
which I am required to give effect because it has been appropriately invoked
by the defendant, provides a bar to recovery in this action.
When a state enters the courts of another state, it does so with no other
or greater rights of immunities than those enjoyed by individuals or private
corporations. It is subject, like all other suitors, to the provisions of the
statutes of limitation of the state in which it seeks relief. 34 AM. JR. 307-8.
The tax involved was assessed for the calendar year 1944. As admitted in
the complaint, and as established by the evidence, the defendant has been
a resident and domiciliary of Florida since 1946. This action was not
commenced until April 23, 1953.
Concededly it was not brought within three years after the accrual, of the
liability, as was required by the applicable and governing provision of our
statute of limitations (section 95, 11 F.S.) Counsel for the plaintiff, however,
points to section 95.07 F.S., which provides that 'if after the cause of
action (against a person) shall have accrued he depart from the state,
the time of his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.' Counsel argues that since it was shown, without
dispute, that the defendant, after establishing residence in Florida in 1946,
absented himself from the state several times, and since the defendant
has not proved that the aggregate of the periods during which he was in
the state was three years or more, it has not been established that the
action is barred.
The argument is not tenable, because the generally recognized and accepted
rule is that when a plaintiff relies on a defendant's absence as interrupting
the running of a statute of limitation it is necessary for him to show such
absence as will preclude the application of the statute. 34 AM. Jun. 354.
The burden of introducing evidence may shift several times in one case.
While the defendant may have the burden of showing that a claim is
barred, he need only make a prima facie case to shift the burden to the
plaintiff, who then will be obliged to prove such facts as toll the running
of the statute, and if he does, the burden of introducing evidence may again
fall on the defendant. 34 Am. JUR. 353.
The plaintiff's admission and the uncontradicted proof that the defendant has
resided in Florida since 1946 shifted to the plaintiff the burden of showing
that the aggregate of the defendant's periods of absence on sojourns to
other states was such as to reduce the aggregate of the periods during which
he was in the state to less than three years. The plaintiff introduced no
such proof. I must hold, therefore, that the action is barred. The defeat
of the claim is attritbutable solely to the delayed and tardy commencement
of the action.
134. Nothing invidious is intended by the use of the term "irregularly," in
fact, only the farsighted work of the publishers of the Florida Supplement make its
use possible. Formerly one would have stated simply that these cases are not
reported at all. There are several benefits from this series of publications but one
of the most important is that evidenced by the proceedings in Cone v. Cone, the
latest decision being 68 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1953). When this per curiam opinion was
released (from the language used one might see the fine hand of Mr. Justice
Terrell) it caused extravagant comment in the public press. This is almost inevitable
when a superior court describes an inferior as indulging in a "crude, vulgar and
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substance."' 135 In the former, the most difficult problems have usually
fallen in the area where the state court attempts to decide, as an initial
matter, what things in a particular litigated affair are going to be controlled
entirely by the law of the forum, so called lex fori, and what things will
be governed by a reference to same foreign law. Normally, if the state
has any other contact with the matter in litigation than the fact that it
is the forum, it will be able to exercise a great deal of freedom in labeling
things as procedural and hence governed by sonic part of the internal law
of the forum.1 36
Certain problems, however, have been felt 'to lie on a border line
between being properly governed by the law of the forum and properly
governed by the law of some foreign jurisdiction, according to the particular
choice-of-law rule which might be exercised. These problems concern
matters of statutes of limitations, burden of proof and presumptions. In
Florida we find that statutes of limitations arc characterized as procedural
and hence are controlled by the lex fori. There are two statutory rules
which vary this general propbsition and in effect make the 'statute of
limitation substantive for the Florida courts. The first,'37  and less
important, provides that an action upon a judgment or decree of any
court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United
States or of any foreign country, shall be barred within seven years. This
provision has been interpreted to mean that the seven years shall commence
with the presence of the judgment debtor within the State of Florida. 18
Second, there is the more important incorporation or "borrowing"
statute,"8 9 which provides that when the cause of action has arisen in
another state or territory of the United States or in a foreign country,
and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot be maintained against
a person by reason of lapse of time, no action thereupon can be
maintained against him in this state. With these provisions on the
unbecoming display of nasty temper" and says that he has "descended to the very
nmudsills of indecorum." For the press comment see Miami Daily News, Dec. 19,
1953 page 3a and The Miami Herald, Dec. 20, 1953. 'Ihe latter newspaper, and
through it the public, had the opinion of the judge in question available to it.
3 Fla. Supp. 168. This permits an important balance to be achieved which otherwise
could not be present. What conclusion one would reach from a careful reading
of the opinion is not as important to the legal profession in its entirety as the
existence of an antidote to the assault on the dignity of the administration of justice
implicit in "Returns High Court's Fire" and "Denies lie 'Blew Top.'" Hc who
gives rise to such unfortunate comments is the real culprit.
135. A third may now be arising in the Federal Courts when they are sitting
in federal-question jurisdiction. See Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952)
and Comment, 39 A.B.A.J. 927 (1953). Two alternatives appear to exist: the first,
an anological application of the Erie rule and the second, a return to Swift v. Tyson
general law.
136. Hartford Accident v. Delta Pine and Land, 292 U.S. 143 (1934). But cf.
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
137. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2) (1953).
138. Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 100 So. 794 (1924).
139. FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1953).
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books and since all the other statutory limitation provisions 140 have been
held by the Supreme Court of Florida to be governed by the law of the
forum, the "tolling" question is the most difficult remaining.
The Van Deren case 141 interpreted the language "return to the state"
and hence incorporated the tolling provisions of the Florida law, 42 normally
governing only in procedural matters, into the foreign statute. This could
give rise to a substantive characterization by a state in order to take
advantage of a double tolling provision. The foreign courts construing
the Florida statutes have normally held them to be substantive. 143  The
basic distinction appears to be that if the limiting statute is a part of
another statute which creates the right, it is held to be a part of
that right controlled by the foreign jurisdiction. Doubt arises when
we reach the problem, of whether this includes the tolling provisions of
the state in question as well.
Federal Iaw.-The other area in which substance-procedure is
important, and in which, as has been pointed out, it has entirely different
meaning, is that of the federal diversity, jurisdiction. In the fifteen
years since Erie v. Tompkins we have witnessed a trend of decisions'1 '
ending with the general rule that the federal courts sitting in diversity
must apply the state law of the state in which they sit in all matters
where to apply federal law would substantially affect the outcome of
the litigation. This rule has given rise to an extremely flexible (and
somewhat artificial) terminology which attempts a new classification
labeling those matters in which the federal court has the right to use
its own law procedural, and those in which it must use the state law
substantive.
An extremely recent and very interesting decision is that of Mark v.
Ormond Beach, 4" construing a burden of proof statute recently passed in
Florida. 40 It was held that this statute must be utilized by the federal
courts, in spite of the fact that the statute bad not been characterized ;H
the state courts of Florida. Simpson, J., stated:
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins ... ,if
Section 51.12 deals with procedural matters only, it has no effect
140. See generally annotations to F.S.A. c. 95.
141. See note 138 supra.
142. FLA. STAT. § 95.07 (1953). See discussion in Burkman v. Tarau, note 133
supra.
143. But cf. Alropa Corp. v. Smith, 240 Mo. App. 376, 199 S.W.2d 866 (1947)
with Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio 30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941).
144. That the rule includes the state's characterization rules, Sampson v.
Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940), and its
conflict rules, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) which
were logical extensions, through the cases destroying procedural hegemony, Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) and culminating in Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 4 MIAMI L.Q. 380 (1950).
145. 113 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Fla. 1953).
146. FtA. STAT. § 51.12 (1953).
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in the United States Court and the complaints should be dismissed,
for they clearly fail to state a claim on which relief could be
granted under common law. 1-owever, if the statute relates
to matters of substance, the statute applies in the United States
Court and the motions should de denied.
It is my view that the statute is more than merely procedural
and that the changing of the burden of proof at the trial and
establishing a presumption of liability thereunder, grant the
plaintiff a substantive right, the benefit of which he is entitled to
receive in the Federal Court, as well as in the State Court,
The statute has never been construed by the Supreme Court of
Florida, and research does not indicate the construction of a
similar statute by the Courts of another State or by any United
States Court. But much authority . . . indicates that matters
touching burden of proof are substantive ii nature, rather than
procedural. 47
What is most interesting about the court's statement is that it assumes
that the construction of the statute by the Supreme Court of Florida
would bind the federal court. The extent to which a federal court
in diversity cases must accept the characterization by the state court
of its own law has not been definitely decided as yet. Some of the
federal courts have held that the acceptance of the characterization
is sufficient without more, and that once having accepted the
characterization made by the state court they may then proceed to utilize
n, entirely different set of choice-of-law rules than those of the state court
which made the characterization. 48
CHOICE OF LAW
Creation and transfer of interests in tangible chattels.-The general
question of the law to be selected to govern the validity -of chattel
mortgages has arisen in several recent Florida cases dealing with
automobile-transfer problems. No specific guides for the selection of
general choice-of-law rules to determine the relationship between the
original parties to a chattel mortgage or other security transaction have
been found in the Florida cases. Tie decisions close to point assume
without deciding that the law normally applicable to personal contracts,
e.g. the place of making, will control rather than the law of the situs
of the chattel at the time of the making of the contract.
'he most difficult problems in the field of security transactions
147. 113 F. Supp. 504, 505 (S.D. Fla. 1953). Reference is made by the court
to the collection of authorities on this general rule in 21 A.L.R.2d 257 and to the
substantive character granted another statutory right, that created by FLA. STAT.
§ 768.05 (1951) establishing a presumption of negligence on the part of a railroad
company in a grade crossing accident. For similar respect paid an analogous right
see the treatment of FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1951) in Phoenix Indemnity Co. v.
Anderson's Groves Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1949), 4 MIAMi L.Q. 398 (1950).
148. For what is a really astounding error in this field, see In re Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York, 188 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1951) where the court stated that
the Erie doctrine only applies to matters arising ex delicto original opinion 161 F.2d I
(5th Cir. 1947).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
are those of the innocent purchaser vis-a-vis the chattel mortgagee or
other holder of a secured title. In 1947, the Supreme Court decided
the case of Lee v. Bank of Georgia.14u Thle owner of the automobile,
a resident of Georgia, had borrowed money from the Bank of Georgia.
To secure repayment, lie executed a "Bill of Sale" in proper local
form and the bank duly recorded same. The owner removed the automobile
without the bank's consent and sold it. The present defendants acquired
the title as remote transferees without notice of plaintiff's lien and in
reliance on a Florida certificate of title duly issued by the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner showing that the automobile was free of liens.
At that time the statute 50 required recordation and the court held
that it protected a bona fide purchaser even where the failure to record
was non-negligent or due to the wrongful removal of the chattel.
The court stated the general rule to be that:
* . . if the mortgage is valid according to the law of the state
where the property was located before removal, . . . it will be
enforced in the courts of the state to which the property had
been removed as a matter of comity, although it is not executed
or filed according to the requirements of the law of the state
of removal. This is especially true where the property is removed
without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee.' 5
The statute said nothing to indicate that the recordation requirement
extended to foreign chattel mortgages but the court concluded its
opinion with this language:
In this case there is no question of violation of any constitutional
provision but only the withdrawing of comity which would
otherwise exist.'5 2
After several statutory changes, the court decided McQueen v. M.
and J. Finance Corporation'" in 1952. Here an automobile had been
149. 159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7, 13 A.L.R.2d 1306, 1336 (1947).
150. FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1953), which provided:
No liens for purchase money or as security for a debt in the form of a
retain title contract, conditional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, or otherwise,
on a motor vehicle, . . . shall be enforceable in any of the courts of this
state, against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration
and without notice, unless a sworn notice of such lien [containing certain
informationi shall be recorded in the office of the motor vehicle commissioner
of the State of Florida ....
151. Quoted by the court 32 So.2d 719 (1947). (Italics supplied). Stress
must be placed on the fact that the whole question of validity is dealt with in terms
of "comity." The court assumes that the presence of the chattel, even wrongfully
acquired or created, gives constitutional power to adjudicate interests therein. It
analogizes a movable tangible to land. Would the court consider that the law of
the place of recordation should detemine the legal status of the remover? For it
he be thief, he cannot pass good titlel
152. Ibid. The doctrine adopted was a minority one, see Lee v. Bank of Georgia,
159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7, 13 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1947). The case caused the passage
of a new statute, Laws of 1949, c. 25150, now FLA. STAT. § 319.27 (1951), which
made 319.15 inapplicable to automobiles and provided for notations of liens on the
certificate of title. See generally FLA. STAT. C. 319, (1953).
153. 59 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1952).
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brought in to Florida still bearing foreign license plates. Under the then
prevailing law, the existence of such out-of-state license plates was held
to put the purchaser on notice. Mere inquiry of the Florida Moto
Vehicle Commissioner as to the state of the title would not be sufficient
to make him a bona fide purchaser. 154 If the purchaser is put on such
notice as to destroy his bona fides by the presence of foreign license
plates, then he must, logically be given a means of protecting himself;
particularly in those states where no notation of lien is required to be
placed on the certificate of title or where the recordation of lien is in
the county or city of the original purchaser's residence and - he has
moved before coming to Florida.
The MeQueen case was followed in the same year by Livingston v.
National Shawrnut Bank of Boston. 55 There one Zeady had purchased
an automobile from a dealer in Maine and executed a conditional sales
contract to secure the balance due. This contract was assigned to the
bank and recorded in the office of the city clerk in Portland, Maine, as
required by the laws of the State of Maine. The state issued its official
certificate of registration to Zeady and he came to Florida where lie
sold the automobile to the Parrish Motor Company. The certificate of
registration and bill of sale were transferred to Parrish together with
Zeady's warranty that the title was free of emeumbrances. Parrish sold
same to a third person without obtaining a Florida certificate of title.,,
While this third person was applying for his Florida certificate of
title and thus, inferentially at least, while the automobile still bore foreign
license plates, the bank intervened, filed its notice of the lien and
attempted to have the conditional sales contract noted on the certificate.
The Commissioner declined to so note' 57 and the present litigation
commenced. Temporary injunction issued against the Commissioner.
Parrish Motor Company repurchased the car from the subsequent
purchaser. The chancellor below reached the conclusion that the lien
of the bank was prior and superior to Parrish and that it was entitled
to the entire proceeds.
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
Insofar as such final decree holds that the lien of the Bank is
superior to the rights of the Parrish Motor Company, we find
no error. Section 319.15, Florida Statutes ...as interpreted by
154. The court, inter alia, construed §§ 319.21, 319,22 and 319.28. No action
had been taken under 319.28, and 319.22 was held applicable to transfers of Florida
titles, not to suitations where no title existed here. The dealer's authority to assign
under 319.21 was limited to situations where the removal has not been so recent
as to put the purchaser under a duty of inquiry at the State of licensing.
155. 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1952).
156. Under the authority of FLA. STAT. § 319.28 (1953).
157. Cf. action of this officer and its consequences in Wilson v. Bankers Inv. Co.,
47 So.2d 779 (1950) and comment thereon in 5 MIAMI L.Q. 282 especially n. 13(1951). For another intermediate ease, see Inman v. Rowsey, 41 So.2d 655 (1949).
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this Court in Lee v. Bank of Georgia . . . 11o longer controls
the rights of lien holders whose liens attached subsequent to
August 1, 1949, by virtue of the provisions [of what is now F.
stat. §] 319.27...
There is nothing in Chapter 319, as amended, ... to indicate
that the Legislature intended to cut off the rights of holders
of liens valid in and registered under the law of the State
wherein such liens were created, as such rights had been previously
enforced in this state under the rle of comity. Nor can the
contention of . . . Parrish ...that it was a 'bona fide purchaser'
be sustained. See McQueen v. 1\. & I. Finance Corp. Fla.
59 So.2d 491518
It is interesting to note that these results of the McQueen-Livingston
doctrine were given legislative sanction at the 1953 session.150  This
action, particularly the new Section 319.27 (3) (f) (3), apparently resolves
the question of the extent of notice given a purchaser of an automobile
not having a Florida certificate of title, and makes the scope of inquiry
more specific. -The statute represents an advance in that it codifies the
rule and makes the duties and obligations of the purchaser of that most
important of movable chattels cleafer.'00
158. 62 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1952). The court concluded by granting the bank
superiority only to the extent of its lien and remitted the balance, if any, to Parrish
as junior lienholder.
159. By § 7 of c. 28184, Laws of 1953 which was part of a general law
amending title certificate procedure. This section completely changed FL. STAT. § 319.27
(3) (1951). The pertinent lettered subsection is (f) which reads:
Any person, firm or corporation purchasing a motor vehicle upon which not
certificate of title has been issued in Florida shall he deemed to be an
innocent purchaser for value, without notice, of any retain title contract,
conditional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, provided such purchaser:
(1) Procures from the person selling such vehicle a sworn statement showthg:
a2 That no lien does exist.
Name and address of owner on the date the current tag on such
vehicle was acquired;
(c) County and State where current tag on such vehicle was acquired;
(2) Attaches to such sworn statement the certificate of title if one has been
issued.
(a) If a certificate of title has not been issued, procures from the
seller an oath that no certificate of title has ever been issued, and
(3) Obtains a telegram or statement in writing from the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner, or like officer, in the state of the current tag, to the
effect that no lien does exist on said motor vehicle. If facilities do
not exist in that office for the recording liens, then the purchaser shall
obtain a telegram or statement in writing from the recording officer of the
city or county and state of the residence of the seller as shovn by the
sworn statement, that no lien against said motor vehicle is of record in
such county.
160. Some questions are still left open. Suppose the purchaser inquires at the
place of residence on the sworn statement but the recordation is not at that place;
or the problem arises as to the law to be selected to determine the scope and
effect of notice which is to be given the recordation of a lien in a place foreign
to that of licensing.
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CONCLUSION
In all article such as this one, limited to a period as it is, many
fields of conflict of laws have not been touched by the courts or
legislature. It is hoped that these omissions will not result in too
deficient a product. As the surveys continue, more and more can be
added through the cooperative efforts of the bar, the students at the
various colleges of law and the courts. Without any attempt at including
even a significant portion of the enormous literature in this subject, brief
mention should be made of recent and readable articles which. may
contribute much to this development.
Invaluable, of course, are the pioneer surveys (of American Law
and New York Law) to which this author wishes to pay his humble
respects for guidance in the writing of this article. For an excellent
synthesis of the work of the Supreme Court, reference should be had
to the Harvard Law Review. 61 The Vanderbilt Law Review published
an excellent collection of articles in a symposium dedicated to this field. 162
Among the single articles, particularly rewarding are Judge Clark's
comment on Crosskey and The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie;6  a
series'" of articles by Ehrenzweig presenting some well developed new
points of view and a fine historical introduction by Yntcma. 65
In closing, then, another mention should be made of the fine work
done by the law reviews presently published by two of the Colleges of
Law in this state. No attempt has been made to list .the notes and
comments written. A glance at the cumulative indices will clearly show
the effort already expended on this difficult field. It is hoped that it
will be expanded in the future, both in the scope of treatment -by the
existing reviews and by the addition of new legal magazines within this
area.
161. In the first number of each volume appcais a review of the work of the
Supreme Court in the preceding term. For the 1951 term see 66 1I1AR. L. REV.
89 (1952); for the 1952 term see 67 HARV. L. REv. 91, 121, 150 (1953).'
162. 6 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1953).
163. The full title of this Article, which formhs part of a symposium on Prof.
Crosskey's book, is Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie-Tomp kins,
21 U. or Cm. L. REv. 24 (1953).
164. The series is made up of his, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts:
Law and Reason Versus The Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1951); Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees (same sub-title), 51 Mimi. L. Rnv. 345 (1953); Recog-
nition of Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2 Am. J. Comip. L. 167 (1953), and
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoL. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
165. The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. Comcp. L. 297 (1953).
